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well be capable of coordinating their decisions successfully.Buthowaretheyabletodoso?
Coordinationwithoutcommunicationisgenerallyreferredtoastacit coordination (e.g.,Abele& Stasser,2008; VanDijk,DeKwaadsteniet,&De Cremer,2009 ).InhisfamousbookThe Strategy of Conflict (1960) , the Nobel Prize-winning economistThomasC.Schellingwasthefirsttoaddress this concept. He argued that people are often capable of tacitly coordinating their actions. To illustratethisphenomenonof tacitcoordination, Schelling gave the example of two people who aimtomeeteachotherinNewYorkCitywithout havingapriorunderstandingonwheretomeet, andatwhattimetheyshouldmeet.Whereshould theygo,andatwhattime?WhenSchellingasked his research participants this question, most of them indicated that they would go to Grand CentralStation,at12.00noon.If theyindeeddid act accordingly in such a situation, this would meanthattheywouldbeabletomeettheother person,andthattacitcoordinationwouldthusbe highly effective. Schelling presented his participants with numerous different coordination games. Inallof thesegames,twoplayerscouldearnan amountif theymanagedtobothchoosethesame option(alsoreferredtoasmatching games;Abele& Stasser, 2008; Bacharach & Bernasconi, 1997; Camerer, 2003) , such as "write some positive number", "choose a color", etc. In most cases, peoplewerehighlycapableof tacitlycoordinating their decisions by both choosing the most salient option (e.g., most participants chose the number1whentheyhadtowritethesameposi-tivenumber;alsoseeMehta, Starmer,&Sugden, 1994) . These simple matching games thus illustratethatpeopleareoftencapableof effectively coordinatingtheirdecisions,evenwhencommunication is impossible, by basing their decisions onsalientcuesinthetaskenvironment(i.e.,environmentalinformation).
But how do people identify what is a salient cuefortacitcoordinationpurposes?Earlierstudies (e.g., Bacharach & Bernasconi, 1997; Mehta et al., 1994; Schelling, 1960) have consistently shown that if people have to choose the same option(alsoreferredtoasmatching),theyoften decide to choose the one option that sticks out from the rest, such as Grand Central Station in Schelling's New York City example. In other words, in matching situations, people tend to choose the most salient or prominent option (Colman, 2006; Sugden & Zamarron, 2006) . Fromthisliterature,onemaybeinclinedtoconcludethatsalienceisonlydeterminedbytheenvironmental characteristics of the coordination situationathand(e.g.,characteristicsof theavailablechoiceoptions).Whatwedrawattentionto inthepresentarticle,however,isthatsuchsaliencemaynotonlybedeterminedbyenvironmentalcharacteristics,butalsobythecharacteristics of the people involved (i.e., social information; seealsoDeKwaadsteniet&VanDijk,2010).
Inreal-lifecoordinationsituations,peoplemay notonlyhaveinformationaboutcharacteristicsof the task itself, but also social information about the characteristics of the person(s) they have to coordinatewith,suchastheirsex,age,education, etc.Aswewillargueandshow,suchsocial informationmayaffectthesalienceof theavailablechoice options and, consequently, the choice behavior that derives from such salience. In other words, wearguethatsocialinformationmayserveasan effective cue for tacit coordination. Surprisingly, however, the influence of social information on tacitcoordinationhasremainedlargelyuninvestigated.Inthepresentarticle,wethereforeexamine whenandhowpeoplemayemploysuchinformationtoachievecoordinationsuccess.
Social information as a cue for matching
Howcanpeopleusesocialinformationtotacitly matchtheirdecisions?Inotherwords,howcan they employ information about another's sex, raceoreducationasacueforsuccessfulmatching?Wearguethatthesharednessof suchcharacteristicsplaysakeyrolehere.Thatis,if acertain characteristic is shared among people, and they focusonthissharednessasabasisfortheirdecisions,thismayhelpthemtoachievecoordination success.Thisideacanbeillustratedwithasimple thought experiment. Imagine two psychology studentswhowanttostudytogetherforanexam butwhocannotcommunicatewithoneanother. Whereshouldtheygoinordertomeet?If they both focus on whattheyhavein common with one another (i.e., that they are psychology students)andtheyusethissharednessasabasisfor theirdecisions,theymayindeedbeabletomeet. Afterall,inthatcasetheymaytacitlycoordinate by meeting at the library of the psychology department. Likewise, if two law students want tostudytogether,theymaytacitlycoordinateby goingtothelibraryof thelawfaculty.Thissimple example illustrates that when people base their matching decision on the choice option that is associated with their shared characteristic, this mayindeedleadtosuccessfultacitcoordination.
Butwhatshouldpeopledowhentheyhaveto match their decisions and they cannot use the above strategy to achieve successful matching because the relevant characteristic is unshared? Howdotheythenidentifythemostappropriate choicetomake?Forinstance,whatif apsychology student and a law student were to face the tacitcoordinationproblemaboutwheretostudy? If each student were then to go to their own library,theywouldcertainlynotbeabletomeet. In the case of unshared characteristics, people shouldthusadoptanalternativestrategytomatch their decisions. In that case, they should go for themostappropriate"neutral"option.Morespecifically, instead of going to their own libraries, thepsychologyandlawstudentshouldthengoto themostappropriateneutrallocation,inthiscase theCentralUniversitylibrary.However,itshould benotedthatthisstrategyonlyyieldsanunambiguous solution, and thus leads to successful coordination,if thereisonesuchneutraloption. Thus,knowledgeaboutwhichcharacteristicsare unshared-by indicating which choice options should be avoided-can also be used to match decisions. Although the above reasoning seems highly plausible, previous research on tacit coordinationhasoverlookedthepotentialrole of socialinformationasacuefortacitcoordination.Therefore,thefirstaimof thepresentarticle is to investigate whether people actually employ the above-described strategies to tacitly match their decisions (Study 1: Social informationinmatchinggames).
Social information as a cue for mismatching
Notethattheabovereasoningislimitedtosituationsinwhichpeoplearerequiredtomatchtheir choices.Likewise,thebulkof earlierresearchon tacit coordination-including Schelling's own work-has mainly focused on matching situations (see e.g., Bacharach & Bernasconi, 1997; Crawford,Gneezy,&Rottenstreich,2008; Mehta etal.,1994) .Inmanyreal-lifecoordinationsituations, however, it is not required that people match their decisions, but that they mismatch their choices (Abele & Stasser, 2008; Arthur, 1994; Heath, Ho, & Berger, 2006 
Choosing coordination partners
Above,wehaveconcentratedonthe(in)effectiveness of tacit coordination, with the common themebeingthatsocialinformation,incombinationwiththerequirementsforcoordinationsuccess (i.e., matching or mismatching), may determinewhichoptionspeoplechooseincoordinationsituations.Ourlineof reasoningisbased on the idea that people will try to choose those options that, given the information they have about their co-players and the coordination requirements,increasetheirchancesof success.In asimilarvein,onecouldarguethatif decisionsare indeed based on such expectancies of success, people may also select coordination partners in suchawaythattheirchancesof successaremaximized.Thatis,whenfacedwithamatchingtask, people might prefer partners who are similar to themselves, whereas in a mismatching task they might prefer partners who are different. Interestingly, this issue of partner selection has not yet been addressed in the research on tacit coordination.Therefore,thisisthefourthissuewe addressinthecurrentarticle(Study4:Preferences forsimilarversusdifferentco-players).
Overview
Weinvestigateallof theissuesdescribedabovein aseriesof fourexperimentalstudies.InStudy1, wefocusonmatchingsituations.Weinvestigate whether people use the sharedness (rather than unsharedness) of individual characteristics as a cuetotacitlymatchtheirdecisions.InStudy2,we focus on mismatching situations, and we test whetherpeopleusetheunsharedness(ratherthan sharedness)of individualcharacteristicsasacue for mismatching. Furthermore, in Study 3, we investigate the boundary conditions of these effectsbytestingourideathatsocialinformation onlyservesasaneffectivecuefortacitcoordination when there is a clear association between suchinformationandtheavailablechoiceoptions. Finally,inStudy4,weaddresstheissueof how people choose their coordination partners. By doingso,wecantestwhetherpeoplehaveapreference for similar others when matching is required,andwhethertheyhaveapreferencefor dissimilarotherswhenmismatchingisrequired.
Study 1
Study1addressesourfirstquestion,i.e.,whether people use social information as a cue for tacit matching.WetestthisideausingaSchelling-type matchinggameinwhichtwoplayersarerequired tochoosethesameoptionwithoutbeingableto communicate with one another (cf. Schelling, 1960) .Basedonourreasoning,weformulatethe following two hypotheses. First, we expect that when a certain characteristic is shared among playersof amatchinggame,theywillmostoften choose the option that is associated with this characteristic(Hypothesis1).Second,weexpect thatwhenplayershavedifferentindividualcharacteristics,theywillmostoftenavoidtheoptions thatareassociatedwitheitheroneof thesecharacteristics, and choose a neutral option instead (Hypothesis2).
Method
Participants Participants were 97 students at LeidenUniversity(37menand60women,Mage =21.42years)whoparticipatedvoluntarilyinthe study.
Procedure The participants were invited to participate in a study on "decision making". Uponarrivalatthelaboratorytheywereseatedin separate cubicles, each containing a personal computer. This computer was used to give instructionstotheparticipantsandtoregisterthe dependentmeasures.
Onceseated,wepresentedparticipantswitha Schelling-typematchinggame.Inthisgame,participants were presented with three colors, i.e., blue,pinkandyellow,andtheywereaskedtoeach pickoneof thesethreecolors.Thesethreecolors werechosenbecause,inWesternculture(seee.g., Brabandt & Mooney, 1989; Zucker & Bradley, 1995) ,thecolorblueisgenerallyassociatedwith themalesex,pinkisassociatedwiththefemale sex,andyellowisgenerallyperceivedasagenderneutralcolor.Participantsweretoldthatif they succeeded in both picking the same color, they would have a chance of winning a monetary amountof €20. Participantswererandomlyassignedtothree experimental conditions (Social Information: SharedCharacteristicvs.UnsharedCharacteristic vs. Control). In the Shared and the Unshared Characteristic conditions, participants received bogusinformationaboutthefirstnameof their co-player.ThenameJohanwasusedtoindicatea male co-player whereas the name Johanna was usedtoindicateafemaleco-player.Bothof these namesarequitecommoninTheNetherlands,the former one being unambiguously male and the latter one being unambiguously female. Thus, althoughwedidnotexplicitlytellthemwhether their co-player was male or female, participants couldinfertheirco-player'ssexfromhis/herfirst name.Additionally,participantswereaskedtofill in their own first name and they were told that thisnamewouldalsobesenttotheirco-player. IntheSharedCharacteristiccondition,thename of theco-playerindicatedthatthisco-playerwas of the same sex as they themselves. In the UnsharedCharacteristiccondition,thenameof theco-playerindicatedthatthisco-playerwasof the opposite sex than they were; and in the Controlconditionnoinformationwasexchanged between the two players, so participants were unawareof thesexof theirco-player.Notethat thislattercondition(i.e.,theControlcondition) closely resembles the procedure used in earlier experimental studies on matching games (cf. Abele&Stasser,2008; Bacharach&Bernasconi, 1997; Mehtaetal.,1994; Schelling,1960) .
Attheendof theexperimentalsession,which lasted about 20 minutes, all participants were debriefed, thanked and paid equally for their participation(i.e.,eachparticipantreceived€3). Furthermore,threeprizesof €20wererandomly allotted among the participants. All participants agreedtothispaymentprocedure.
Results
Manipulation check
To check whether participants had understood the experimental manipulation,afterwardstheywereaskedtoindicatewhethertheirco-playerwasaman,awoman or whether they had not received information thatwasindicativeof thesexof theirco-player. Allparticipantsansweredthisquestioncorrectly, whichindicatesthattheyhadallunderstoodand remembered the social information they had beengiven.
The participants' choices Totestourhypotheses, we first recoded the participants' choices intothreecategories,namelyinto(a)sex-typical choices(i.e.,pinkforwomenandblueformen); (b)sex-atypicalchoices(i.e.,blueforwomenand pink for men); and (c) sex-neutral choices (i.e., yellow). sex-typicalcolor(Hypothesis1),intheUnshared CategoryMembershipconditionthesex-neutral option was chosen most frequently (Hypothesis 2).Theseresultsindicatethatplayersindeeduse socialinformationasacuetodeterminethemost salientoptioninmatchingsituations.Furthermore, theseresultsshowthatthesharednessof characteristics plays a key role in this process. Only when a characteristic is shared, do the options thatareassociatedwiththischaracteristicbecome salient as a cue for matching. However, when players do not share characteristics, players will opt for more category-neutral choices instead (forotherresearchshowingthatplayerscoordinate on the neutral option, see Van Huyck, Gilette,&Batallio,1992) .
Furthermore,itmaybeinterestingtonotethat intheControlcondition,inwhichplayersdidnot have information about one another's sex, participantsalsochosethesex-neutraloptionmost frequently.Webelievethatthismightbedueto the fact that this sex-neutral option was positioned in the middle (i.e., in between the other twocolors),possiblymakingitafocalpointfor coordination (cf. Schelling, 1960) . This also impliesthatparticipantsintheUnsharedconditionmayhavechosenthisoptionnotbecauseit was sex-neutral, but because of its spatial positioning. Related to this, it should be noted that, although the majority of participants clearly employed the social information, we cannot excludethepossibilitythatsomeparticipantsmay haveframedthetaskdifferently(i.e.,notinterms of sex-neutralversussex-typicaloptions).Thatis, someparticipantsmayhaveusedothercues,such asthespatialpositioningof theoptions,todeterminetheirchoices.
Study 2
InStudy2,wefocusonmismatchingsituations, andwetestwhetherpeoplealsousesocialinformationtoachievesuccessfulmismatching.Based onourreasoning,wecanformulatethefollowing hypotheses.First,weexpectthatwhenacharacteristic is unshared among players, and they are required to mismatch their decisions, they will most often choose the option that is associated with their own characteristic (Hypothesis 3). Second, we expect that when players share the same characteristic or when characteristics are unknown,thiswillnothelpthemtoidentifythe option that they should choose to achieve successfulmismatching. 
Method
Participants Participants were 89 students at LeidenUniversity(33menand56women,Mage =20.62years)whoparticipatedvoluntarilyinthe study.
Procedure The experimental procedure of this second study was almost identical to the procedureof thefirstone.Theonlydifference wasthatinStudy2participantsweretoldthat if they succeeded in both picking a different color(i.e.,theywereaskedtomismatch),they would have a chance of winning a monetary amountof €20.Again,participantswererandomly assigned to the three experimental conditions.
Results
Manipulation check
To check whether participants had understood the experimental manipulation,afterwardstheywereaskedtoindicate if their co-player was a man, a woman or whether they had not received information that was indicative of the sex of their co-player. All participants answered this question correctly, whichindicatesthattheyhadallunderstoodand 
Discussion
Theresultsof Study2againsupportourhypoth-eses. Whereas in the Unshared Category Membership condition participants most frequentlychosetheirsex-typicalcolor(Hypothesis 3), there was high behavioral variance in the SharedCategoryMembershipandintheControl condition (Hypothesis 4). Note that this high behavioral variance may imply that (a) participants had no idea which strategy to use and thereforechoserandomly,or(b)thattheycame up with various different strategies to achieve successful mismatching. Irrespective of their underlyingstrategies,however,thehighvariance in these conditions corroborates our idea that therewasnounambiguouscueforcoordination. In contrast to when matching is required, this 
Study 3
The results of the two studies presented above corroborateourideathatsocialinformationcan facilitatetacitcoordination(i.e.,matchingaswell as mismatching). However, as we have already arguedintheintroductiontothisarticle,thereare boundaryconditionstothecoordinatingpotentialof socialinformation.Socialinformationonly providesanunambiguouscuefortacitcoordination when there is a clear association between suchinformationandtheavailablechoiceoptions. Inourthirdstudy,wetestthisideabyagainpresentingparticipantswithaSchelling-typematching game. However, this time we will give participants information about two individual characteristics of their co-player. Based on our reasoning, we expect that participants will only use social information that is instrumental to achievingcoordinationsuccess(i.e.,information that is associated with the available choice options), while ignoring social information that appears irrelevant. More specifically, we only expectparticipants'decisionstobeinfluencedby social information that is associated with the availablechoiceoptions(Hypothesis5).
Method
Participants and design Participantswere90 studentsstudyingattheFacultyof SocialSciences atLeidenUniversity(46menand44women,M age=20.22years)whoparticipatedvoluntarilyin thestudy.A2(Sex:Sharedvs.Unshared)×2(Faculty: Shared vs. Unshared) between-participants factorial design was used. The participants were paid€3fortheirparticipation.
Procedure The procedure used in this study wasverysimilartotheoneusedinStudy1.Again, we presented participants with a Schelling-type matching game (cf. Schelling, 1960) . This time, however, participants were not presented with threecolors,butwiththreeUniversitybuildings, i.e.,theSocialSciencesFaculty,theLawFaculty and the Central University Library.
3
They were askedtoeachpickoneof thesethreebuildings andtheyweretoldthatif theysucceededinboth picking the same building, they would have a chanceof winningamonetaryamountof €20.
Participants were randomly assigned to four between-participants conditions. Whereas in Study 1 participants only received information aboutthesexof theirco-player(i.e.,SharedSex vs.UnsharedSex),inthepresentstudytheyalso received information about the faculty at which their co-player studied (i.e., Shared Faculty vs. UnsharedFaculty).IntheSharedFacultycondition, participants were informed that their coplayer studied at the same Faculty as they themselves (i.e., the Faculty of Social Sciences) and that their co-player also knew this. In the Unshared Faculty condition, participants were informedthattheirco-playerstudiedattheLaw Faculty and that their co-player also knew this. Thus, participants were explicitly told that both playershadthesamekindof informationabout theotherplayer.Inotherwords,theyknewthat thissocialinformationwascommonknowledge.
Attheendof theexperimentalsession,which lasted about 20 minutes, all participants were debriefed,thankedandpaidequallyfortheirparticipation (i.e., each participant received € 3). Furthermore,threeprizesof €20wererandomly allotted among the participants. All participants agreedtothispaymentprocedure.
Results
Manipulation check
To check whether participants had understood the experimental manipulations, afterwards they were asked to indicatewhethertheirco-playerwasamanora woman and at which Faculty their co-player studied. All participants answered these two questionscorrectly,whichindicatesthattheyhad allunderstoodandrememberedthesocialinformationtheyhadbeengiven. 
The participants' choices
Discussion
Theresultsof ourthirdstudyillustrateouridea that social information influences decisions in coordinationsituationswhenthereisaclearassociationbetweensuchinformationandtheavailable choice options, and that irrelevant social information does not influence decisions (Hypothesis 5). Additionally, in this study we replicatedtheresultsof Study1,thistimeusing differentsocialinformationanddifferentchoice labels.Weagainshowedthat,whenacharacteristicissharedamongtheplayers,theoptionsthat areassociatedwiththischaracteristicarechosen mostoften,andwhenplayersdonotsharecharacteristics, they opt for more category-neutral choicesinstead.
Study 4
In the previous studies, we tested our ideas by investigatingtheoptionsparticipantschose(i.e., colorsinStudies1and2andUniversitybuildings inStudy3).Inourreasoningabouthowpeople determinetheirchoices,wemadetheassumption thattheychoosethoseoptionsthat(theythink) willmaximizetheirchancesof coordinationsuccess.Note,however,thatbydoingso,weinevitablyintroducedsomecircularityinourreasoning thatisinfactpartof whattacitcoordinationisall about.Strictlyspeaking,thereisnoa prioriwayof defining what would be a successful option in tacitcoordinationsettings;Whatissuccessfulcan onlybederivedfromwhatmostpeoplechoose. Forexample,inthecaseof thematchingproblem weusedinStudy1:if maleparticipantsgenerally opt for blue when trying to coordinate with anothermaleparticipant,itautomaticallyfollows that opting for blue is a successful strategy and opting for pink is not. But does this also imply that male participants opt for blue because they want to be successful in tacit coordination? We thinkthatitdoes,andof courseourfindingsthat male participants opted for a sex-neutral color (yellow)whentryingtomatchtheirchoiceswith afemaleparticipantdofitwiththisideaof success-driven choices. Nevertheless, because the successof astrategycanonlybeindirectlyderived fromobservingchoices,itmaybeworthwhileto complement these analyses with an alternative waytoinvestigatethelinkbetweenexpectedsuccessandtacitcoordination,namelybyinvestigatingpreferencesforcoordinationpartners. If peopleindeedtrytomaximizetheirchances of success,onewouldexpectthat-whengivena choicebetweenpotentialcoordinationpartnerspeople select the partner that would maximize theirchancesof success.Toinvestigatethis,we reliedonthefindingsweobtainedinStudies1-3. Hereweobservedthatsharednessenhancedsuccessful coordination in matching tasks, and unsharedness enhanced successful coordination inmismatchingtasks.Now,if thesefindingswere indeedtheresultof adeliberateprocesssuchthat participants anticipated and incorporated the chancesof successwhenmakingtheirdecisions, one might expect that participants should also take these chances into account when deciding withwhomtheymightprefertoplaythecoordinationgame.Thisreasoningleadstoanalternativewaytotestourideas,namelyaprocedurein whichweaskparticipantswhatkindof co-player (e.g., a woman or a man) they would want to coordinatewith,whichistheprocedureweusein Study4.Besidesprovidinganalternativetestof ourideas,thisprocedureallowsustoinvestigate whether people really understand how social information,byprovidingunambiguouscuesfor whichoptiontochoose,canfacilitatecoordination success. More specifically, with this procedure we can test whether people realize that sharedness can facilitate matching, whereas unsharednesscanfacilitatemismatching.
We formulate the following hypotheses. If peoplerealizethatsharednesscanfacilitatesuccessfulmatching,theywillpreferaco-playerwho issimilartothemselves(Hypothesis6).Bycontrast,if theyrealizethatunsharednesscanfacilitate successful mismatching, they will prefer a co-player who is different from themselves (Hypothesis7).Andfinally,inlinewithfindings from Study 3, we expect that the two previous hypothesesonlyholdwhenthereisaclearassociation between the co-players' characteristics andtheavailablechoiceoptions(Hypothesis8). Giventhefactthatwehaveshownintheprevious studies that successful matching requires shared characteristics and that successful mismatching requires unshared characteristics, we expectthatplayerswillchooseapotentialco-player based only on relevant social information (i.e., socialinformationthatprovidesusefulinformation regarding the available choice options) and will ignore information that has no association withtheavailablechoiceoptions.
Method
Participants Participantswere104studentsat LeidenUniversity(30menand74women,Mage =21.16years)whoparticipatedvoluntarilyinthe study.
Procedure The experimental procedure of thisstudywassimilartotheprocedureof thefirst threestudies.Again,participantswerepresented with a coordination game, this time a game in whichtwoplayerswereaskedtochooseacolor. Thecolorstheycouldchoosefromwerepinkand blue, pink being associated with the female sex and blue being associated with the male sex (Brabandt & Mooney, 1989; Zucker & Bradley, 1995) . Participants were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions: a matching and a mismatching condition. In the matching condition,theyweretoldthatif theysucceededinboth pickingthesamecolor,theywouldhaveachance of winning a monetary amount of € 20.In the mismatching condition, by contrast, they were toldthatif theysucceededinbothpickingadifferent color, they would have a chance of winningamonetaryamountof €20.
All participants were told that, before the gamestarted,theycouldindicatewhotheywould wanttoplaythegamewith.Theycouldchoose betweentwoco-players:afellowparticipantwho wasof thesamesexastheythemselvesbutwho studiedatadifferentfaculty,orafellowparticipant who was of a different sex as they themselvesbutwhostudiedatthesamefaculty.Thus, eachof thesetwoparticipantswassimilartothe participantononecharacteristicanddifferenton another. After participants had indicated which of thesetwopersonstheywouldwanttoplaythe gamewith,theexperimentalsessionwasclosed.
Results
Manipulation check
To check whether participants had understood the experimental manipulation,afterwardstheywereaskedtoindicate what the coordination requirement of the gamewas:(a)tochoosethesamecolorastheir co-player or (b) to choose a different color. All participants answered this question correctly, whichindicatesthattheyhadallunderstoodand rememberedthecoordinationrequirements. 
Co-player selection
Discussion
Thefindingsof ourfourthstudycorroborateour hypotheses. As expected, when matching was required people preferred co-players who were similar to themselves (Hypothesis 6), whereas whenmismatchingwasrequiredpeoplepreferred co-playerswhoweredifferent(Hypothesis7),but only when the respective characteristics were associated with the available choice options (Hypothesis8).Thesefindingssuggestthatpeople indeed realize that social information can serve as an effective cue for tacit coordination. Participants' co-player preferences seemed to reflect the notion that whereas sharedness can facilitate matching, unsharedness can facilitate mismatching.
General discussion
Theaimof thepresentarticlewastoshedsome light on the role of social information in tacit coordination.Whereasearlierresearchhasprimarilyfocusedonhowcharacteristicsof thecoordination task itself influence people's decisions (e.g., Bacharach & Bernasconi, 1997; Schelling, 1960) ,thepresentresearchprovidedafirststep towards showing how social information may also play a role in this process. By investigating this,wepresentedasocial-psychologicalperspectiveonthetopicof tacitcoordination.
In a series of four experiments, we showed that social information can influence people's decisionsincoordinationsituations.Assuch,this 
Social information and salience
Aswementionedintheintroductionof thisarticle, Schelling(1960) The present research provides a tentative answer to this question, namely that people use Schellingsaliencetotacitlycoordinatetheirdecisions. Our findings suggest that people do not basetheirdecisionsonwhatissalientforthemselves(i.e.,primarysalience)orwhatissalientfor theotherplayer(i.e.,secondarysalience),butthat theytakeintoconsiderationthecharacteristicsof both players when determining their decisions. Afterall,weshowedthatpeople'schoicesdonot solelydependontheinformationtheyhaveabout theotherplayer(e.g.,whetherhe/sheisamanora woman),whichwouldmeanthattheywouldapply secondarysalience,butmoresoonwhethercharacteristicsaresharedorunsharedbybothof them. Thisimpliesthat,giventhesocialinformationthat theyhaveaboutoneanother,theytrytofindthe choiceoptionthatisunambiguouslysalientforthe combinationof players.Thus,thepresentfindings indicatethatpeoplemayindeeduseSchellingsaliencetoachievecoordinationsuccess.
Diversity and successful mismatching
Intheliteratureontacitcoordination(e.g., Mehta etal.,1994; Schelling,1960) ,ithasrepeatedlybeen argued that people from the same cultural backgroundmaybebetteratcoordinatingtheirdecisionsbecausetheysharethesameconventions(cf. Binmore, 1992; Richards, 2001) . Whereas one mightsimplyconcludefromthisthatdiversityis detrimentaltotacitcoordination,ourcurrentfindingssuggestthatthismaynotalwaysbethecase. Afterall,theresultsof Studies2and4indicatethat whenmismatchingisrequired,diversitymayeven be beneficial to tacit coordination. It should be noted, however, that even in mismatching situations, shared knowledge about another's cultural backgroundmaybenecessaryfordiversitytofacilitate coordination success (cf. Harrison, Price, & Bell,1998) .Afterall,inordertoemploythestrategiesdemonstratedinthepresentarticle,thepeople involved need to know which choice options are associated with which characteristics (e.g., which color is associated with which sex), which may largely differ between cultures. Thus, whereas diversitywithincultures(i.e.,betweentwoplayers fromthesameculture)mayfacilitatemismatching, diversitybetweencultures(i.e.,betweentwoplayers fromdifferentcultures)mayindeedhampercoordination,especiallyif thepeopleinvolvedhavelittle knowledgeabouttheother'sculturalbackground.
Moreover,theseresultsshowhowfruitfulitis to look not only at matching situations, which havetraditionallyreceivedalotof attentioninthe economic literature, but also to focus on situationsinwhichmismatchingisrequired.Wedemonstratedthatmatchingandmismatchinggames, although hardly ever distinguished in the literature, are very different psychologically (see also Abele&Stasser,2008) .
Limitations and suggestions for future research
Atthispoint,itmaybeimportanttonotethatthe coordinationgamesstudiedinthepresentarticle, justlikeothereconomicgames,aresimplifications of real-life coordination problems (cf. Schelling, 1960) .Thegamesreportedherewerespecifically designedtoillustrateourideathatpeoplemayuse socialinformationtotacitlycoordinatetheirdecisions.Toinvestigatethis,weprovidedparticipants withpiecesof informationabouttheircoordination partner, thereby testing whether and how they would use the provided information to achieve coordination success. Of course, in the real world, coordination situations can be much morecomplexthanthis,andpeoplethenhaveto activelysearchforuseful(socialandenvironmental)informationthemselves.Thequestionremains astowhetherundersuchcircumstances,inwhich theyhavetoactivelysearchforusefulcues,people arestillabletoselectandusethosepiecesof social informationthatcanfacilitatetacitcoordination. Therefore,inordertofurtherenhancethegeneralizability of the present findings, it would be goodif futureresearchsetouttoinvestigatethis issue, for example, by using paradigms in which playershavethepossibilitytoactivelysearchfor informationabouttheircoordinationpartner.
Concluding remark
Thepresentarticleisthefirsttoempiricallydemonstratethatchoicebehaviorintacitcoordination situationsisinfluencedbysocialinformation.We have presented converging evidence that people not only focus on environmental characteristics when coordinating their decisions, but also use characteristicsof thepeopletheyhavetocoordinatewith.Byshowingthis,wehaveshedsomenew lightonthemysterythat,aftersomanydecades, stillsurroundsthephenomenonof tacitcoordination.However,atthesametimewerealizethat,in real-lifecoordinationsituations,theremaybeseveralotherwaysinwhichpeoplemayemploysocial information to tacitly coordinate their decisions. Therefore,itisourhopethatthepresentarticlewill stimulatemoreresearchintothesocial-psychologicalprocessesunderlyingtacitcoordination.
